Mississippi College Law Review
Volume 1

Issue 2

Article 5

1-1-1979

The Admissibility of Law Opinion of the Question of Insanity Alexander v. State
Larry T. Richardson

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.mc.edu/lawreview

Custom Citation
1 Miss. C. L. Rev. 183 (1978-1980)

This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by MC Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Mississippi College Law Review by an authorized editor of MC Law Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact walter@mc.edu.

THE ADMISSIBILITY OF LAY OPINION ON THE
QUESTION OF INSANITY
Alexander v. State, 358 So. 2d 380 (Miss. 1978).
The defendant, John Peyton Alexander, was convicted of murder
and sentenced to life imprisonment. The defendant's primary defense
at trial was that he was not guilty by reason of insanity.
At the age of nineteen (19), the defendant began to have an affair
with the deceased, Harriett Robinson, a thirty-seven year old married
woman he met while working as a lifeguard for the Jackson Country
Club. John Robinson, the husband of the deceased, learned of the affair and telephoned the defendant in October of 1974 at Vanderbilt
University and warned him to stay away from his wife. At this time
the defendant became very confused and upset about his relationship
with Mrs. Robinson and began to see a psychologist at Vanderbilt
University. In January of 1975, the defendant dropped out of college
and returned to Jackson.
During the spring of 1975, the defendant attempted to secure a
position as lifeguard at the Jackson Country Club but was prevented
from doing so when the Robinsons circulated a petition among club
members declaring that the defendant was incompetent. The Robinsons also frustrated the defendant's attempts to become a lifeguard at
the River Hills Club. In retaliation, the defendant photocopied some
love letters from Mrs. Robinson and sent them to club members to
prove that his affair with Harriett Robinson was the reason behind the
Robinson's petition. In May of 1975, John Robinson filed suit against
the defendant for fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00) in damages for
sending the letters.
The defendant became obsessed with the affair and the law suit.
He became fearful that John Robinson was trying to kill him or was
going to have the Mafia kill him, and he began to sleep in the
breezeway of his home with a loaded shotgun between his mattress
and the frame of his bed. During this time, the defendant began to see
a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist placed him on Thorazine, an antipsychotic drug, and attempted to persuade him to leave Jackson. The
defendant contemplated sending copies of Mrs. Robinson's love letters
to Time and Newsweek magazines drawing a parallel between his affair and the affair of the central character of the movie "The
Graduate."
On October 4, 1975, the defendant drove to Parham Bridges Tennis Courts and walked up to Harriett Robinson and shot her eight
times. He then walked calmly off the tennis courts and drove home.
When defendant arrived home, he told his mother that he had just
shot Harriett Robinson. The defendant then phoned the police and
waited for them to arrive. On route to the police station, the defen-
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dant talked to an officer in a calm tone and even discussed a mutual
acquaintance.
At the trial the defendant offered seven lay witnesses who testified
that the defendant did not know the difference between right and
wrong at the time of the crime.' After an examination of these
witnesses in the absence of the jury, the trial court excluded their
testimony on the basis that the witnesses were not qualified to give an2
opinion as to the defendant's mental state at the time of the homicide.
The lay witnesses were acquainted with the defendant, and all had opportunities to observe the defendant before the homicide.' One
witness observed the defendant before and after the homicide.' Their
testimony revealed that the defendant had a disturbed childhood, suffered psychosomatic illnesses, and requested psychiatric help from the
time he was fifteen (15) years old. The testimony also revealed that the
defendant often contemplated suicide.
On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's decision and held that the lay testimony was properly excluded on the grounds that a sufficient predicate had not been
established.' Applying the rule in In Re Estate of Prine, the court held
that a lay witness can not project an opinion to the sanity of another
at a future time.'
The Mississippi Supreme Court stated that the requirements to
establish a sufficient predicate are: "(1) the witness has a reasonably
sufficient opportunity to observe the subject and (2) has noted
behavior on his part reasonably indicative of an unsound mind and
upon which he bases an opinion that the subject was, at the time of his
observation by the witness, of unsound mind."' The court reasoned
that a sufficient predicate had not been established because the lay
witnesses did not state any specific facts or circumstances which indicated that the defendant was insane or incapable to distinguish between right and wrong.' The fact that the lay witness is well acquainted with the defendant is not sufficient to permit the witness to
'358 So. 2d at 382-83. The first witness, Herlihy, was asked the following question:
Do you have an opinion based on your knowing John Alexander since you were
both in the 9th grade, your conversations with him, and your observations of
his demeanor, as to whether on October 4, 1975, when Harriett Robinson was
shot, he knew the difference between right and wrong?
The other witnesses were asked questions similar to the above.
2
1d. at 382.
1d. at 382.

1Id.
s358 So. 2d at 383.
1208 So. 2d 187 (Miss. 1968).
'358 So. 2d at 383.
'Id. at 384.
'Id. at 385.
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express an opinion that the defendant is insane.' 0 The witness must
also observe some act of abnormal behavior which is reasonably
capable of supporting a conclusion of insanity.II
In addition to the insufficient predicate, the court stated that the
lay opinion was also inadmissible because the testimony violated the
rule announced in Prine.'2 In Prine, a civil case involving a will contest, the court adopted the rule that a lay witness can not be allowed
to give an opinion as to the mental condition of another at a future
time. " The court noted that the observations of the lay witness did not
extend to the time the victim was shot, and thus, they should not be
permitted to express an opinion as to the defendant's mental state at
the time of the homicide.'
The lay opinion rule in Mississippi has been the subject of confusion and the requirements for admissibility have been dealt with on a
case by case basis.' 5 As early as 1881, the supreme court held that a
lay witness may testify as to his opinion of the sanity of another.,
Originally, the primary consideration for the admissibility of lay opinions was that the opinion be based on the perceptions of the
witness.'" Later, the court began distinguishing between testimony as
to sanity or insanity. As a result, two standards evolved for determining if a sufficient predicate had been established.'"
First, a lay witness may testify that a person is sane without setting
out the facts upon which the witness's opinion is based.' ' On the other
hand, if the lay opinion is that the defendant is insane then the opinion
must be accompanied by a statement of specific facts upon which it is
"0Id.
IId.
'The court noted that the Prine rule was supported by two criminal cases. Ross v.
State, 153 Tex. Cr. R. 312, 220 S.W.2d 137 (1949); State v. Douglas, 312 Mo. 537, 278
S.W. 1016 (1925).
"208 So. 2d at 190.
"358 So. 2d at 384.
"See generallyComment, Lay Opinion Testimony in Mississippi, 43 MISS. L. J. 705
(1972).
" Wood v. State, 58 Miss. 741 (1881).
" Bishop v. State, 96 Miss. 846, 52 So. 21 (1910). Bacot v. State, 96 Miss. 125, 50
So. 500 (1909). (Court held that trial court erred by giving jury instructions to disregard
the opinion of the lay witness and to judge whether defendant knew right from wrong
based on the circumstances related by the witness.) Reed v. State, 62 Miss. 405, 408-09
(1884). (Error to exclude lay opinion based on witness's acquaintance with the defendant and opportunity to observe his conduct.) Wood v. State, 58 Miss. 741, 743 (1881).
(No requirement that witness articulate specific facts indicative of abnormal behavior
before giving his opinion.)
" Baird v. State, 146 Miss. 547, 112 So. 705 (1927). (Lay witnesses testifying that
defendant was sane based on their ample opportunity to observe his conduct do not
have to state the specific facts upon which the opinion is based. However, lay opinion
that defendant is insane should be accompanied by a statement of specific facts.)
"Id.
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based.2" The court imposed an additional requirement that the lay
witness must first state the facts upon which the opinion is based and
then give the opinion." The admissibility of lay opinions is left largely
to the discretion of the trial court.2" When the defense is insanity, the
court is required to give defendant the largest reasonable latitude that
23
the law will allow.
Although a lay witness is required to show a sufficient opportunity
to observe the defendant's irrational behavior, there is no exact rule
on the extent of the knowledge the witness should possess. 2' However,
the observation of irrational acts must be of such an extent to make
the opinion valuable. 21 In this respect, the requirement is analogous to
Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 21 Rule 701 requires that
the opinions be "rationally based on the perceptions of the witness. 2
Apparently before Prine, a properly predicated lay opinion was
admissible as to the defendant's sanity at the time of the crime even
though the witness was not present when it occurred. 28 Other cases indicate that it was permissible for a lay witness to express an opinion
that the defendant was sane at the time of the crime.29 It is not clear
20

1d.

"1Keeler v. State, 226 Miss. 199, 84 So. 2d 153 (Miss. 1955). But see, Blalock v.
Magee, 205 Miss. 209, 38 So. 2d 708 (1948). (Witness first stated his opinion and then
gave the facts upon which the opinion was based.)
"Waycaster v. State, 185 Miss. 25, 187 So. 205 (Miss. 1939).
"McLeod v. State, 317 So. 2d 389, 391 (Miss. 1975). (When the defense is insanity,
every act of the accused relevant to the issue is admissible and the trial court is to be
liberal in allowing the introduction of evidence or examination of witnesses which tends
to show the insanity of the accused.) Warren v. State, 285 So. 2d 756, 759 (Miss. 1973)
(On the question of insanity, considerable latitude is afforded the examination of
witness). Tarrents v. State, 236 So. 2d 360 (Miss. 1970). Waycaster v. State, 185 Miss.
25, 187 So. 205 (1939). Bishop v. State, 96 Miss. 846, 52 So. 21, 22 (1910). (Requiring
the trial court to give the defendant "the full latitude he is clearly entitled to under the
law in making competent proof as to his sanity or insanity.") Bacot v. State, 96 Miss.
125, 50 So. 500, 501 (1909). ("In inquiries as to the insanity of a person, the largest
reasonable latitude is allowed.")
"Harvey v. State, 207 So. 2d 108, 117-18 (Miss. 1968).
2
1McGarrh v. State, 249 Miss. 247, 148 So. 2d 494, 497 (1963).
"0R. Gray Jr. & S. Hammond Jr., Opinion and Expert Testimony, 49 Miss L.J. 1.
Compare and contrast the federal rules to the state rules concerning the admissibility of
opinion and expert testimony.
"FED. R.EVID. 701.
"Reed v. State. 62 Miss. 405, 408 (1884). (Court held that it was error to exclude the
opinion of a lay witness as to sanity of accused at the time of the crime. The witness had
known the defendant for several years, had seen him nearly everyday, but the witness
did not see him the day of the crime.)
"In the following cases, the admissibility of opinions of a person's mental soundness
at a future time was not in issue, however, dicta indicates that lay opinions are admissible. Rush v. State, 182 So. 2d 214 (Miss. 1966). (Several lay witnesses who did not see
the defendant on the day of the crime, testified that he did not know right from wrong
"at the time of the shooting." McGarrh v. State, 249 Miss. 247, 148 So. 2d 494 (1963).
(Several witnesses who saw the defendant before the crime were permitted to testify that
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whether the Prine rule will apply to such cases. The rule clearly excludes testimony that the person is insane, but the court may adopt a
less restrictive rule for sanity.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has attempted a much needed step
toward the clarification of the requirements for the admissibility of
lay opinions concerning the question of sanity vel non. The instant
case limits lay opinion of the defendant's insanity to the time of the
observation. Any prognosis by a lay witness will be based upon mere
conjecture or speculation. The court has adopted the rule which
precludes lay opinion because the testimony invades the domain of
the expert witness.3"
On the surface, it appears that the court has adopted a standard
similar to that of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 3' The main requirement in Alexander is that the facts articulated by the lay witness be
"reasonably capable" of supporting the opinion of insanity. The twoprong test to establish a proper predicate requires a "reasonably sufficient opportunity to observe" and observation of "behavior
reasonably indicative of an unsound mind." This test is analogous to
that formulated by the Fifth Circuit32 and other jurisdictions.33
However, the requirement of detailing the fact indicative of an unsound mind is confusing and unduly restrictive.
The defense and the state introduced conflicting expert testimony.
Surely the opinions of persons who knew the defendant for several
years would have been a valuable aid to the jury. After evaluating the
lay testimony, the supreme court concluded that the defendant's reactions were no different from those of a normal person under those circumstances. ' A jury, with the aid of the lay opinion testimony, may
have reached the same conclusion.
One witness testified that the defendant was "edgy", "preoccupied
with the affair", "completely obsessed with the affair", and "nervous
and shaking." 3 A similar predicate was established in Reed v. State in
which the witness testified that the defendant was nervous, restless,
the defendant was sane the day of the killing. Williams v. State, 205 Miss. 515, 49 SO.2d
261 (1951). (Witness testified that in his opinion the accused was sane before, at the
time of, and since the crime.) Brummet v. State, 182 Miss. 580, 181 So. 323, 324 (1938).
(Lay witnesses testified that the accused was able to distinguish right from wrong at all
times.) Baird v. State, 146 Miss. 647, 112 So. 705 (1927). (Lay witness testified that the
appellant was sane at the time of the homicide.)
30208 So. 2d 187 (Miss. 1968); Ross v. State, 220 S.W. 2d 137 (Tex. 1949); State v.
Douglas, 312 Mo. 373, 278 S.W. 1016 (1926).
"FED. R. EVID. 701.

"U. S. v. Milne, 487 F.2d 1232 (1973).
"Hunter v. State, 335 So. 2d 194 (Ala. 1976); Wenck v. State, 238 S.W.2d 793 (Tex.
1951); Davis v. State, 28 S.W.2d 993 (Tenn. 1930).
"358 So. 2d at 384.
"Id. at 383, 384.
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and looked wild.36 Yet, in Alexander, the supreme court held that the
predicate. was insufficient. Often witnesses may not isolate the
separate acts of insanity, rather, they perceive insanity as a whole.
Even if the separate impressions can be detailed, they may not convey
the complete picture. The total impression of insanity may result from
other intangibles that the witness can not reduce to words.
The court is requiring a specificity that is a haunting reminder of
the abuses of the lay opinion rule. The exclusion of the opinions of the
witnesses as to the sanity of the accused at the times they observed
him, deprived the jury of important information which was necessary
for determining whether or not the defendant was insane. The requirement for the admissibility of lay opinion testimony should be
that the witness had an opportunity to observe and did observe. The
present rule is impossible to apply consistently and this uncertainty of
the law will result in injustice. Where a defendant is "so restricted in
making ...
the only defense possible for him to make [he is] denied a
fair and impartial trial." 3 7

Larry T. Richardson
"62 Miss. at 406.
"Brock v. State, 92 Miss. 712, 46 So. 67, 68 (1908).

